Techniques Mapped
| # | Target | STRIDE | Severity | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Web Application Firewall | Spoofing | CRITICAL (10.0) | Firewall rule misconfiguration allowing unintended traffic to bypass Web Application Firewall and reach internal networks | |
| 2 | ot scada zone | Denial of Service | CRITICAL (10.0) | (AI) OT SCADA Zone Process Disruption via Network Attack: The OT SCADA Zone has no network-level protections (WAF, IDS, IPS)... | |
| 3 | Edge Router | Tampering | CRITICAL (10.0) | Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Edge Router leading to system compromise | |
| 4 | Web Application Firewall | Tampering | CRITICAL (10.0) | Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Web Application Firewall leading to system compromise | |
| 5 | Reverse Proxy | Tampering | CRITICAL (10.0) | Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Reverse Proxy leading to system compromise |
Threats plotted by Impact (Y-axis, derived from severity score) vs Likelihood (X-axis, derived from risk signals: CVE + CWE + network exposure). Hover over a dot for details.
A higher completeness score improves threat detection accuracy, AI enrichment quality, and severity scoring.
| Check | Score | Wt | Hint |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dataflows authenticated | 0% (0/31) | 15 | Add is_authenticated=true to dataflows that require credentials or token-based auth to reduce false positives in threat scoring. |
| Dataflows encrypted | 29% (9/31) | 15 | Add is_encrypted=true to dataflows that use TLS/SSH/IPSec. Unencrypted flows receive higher STRIDE scores. |
| Dataflows have protocol | 100% (31/31) | 10 | |
| Boundaries trust defined | 100% (9/9) | 15 | |
| Boundaries described | 0% (0/9) | 5 | Add a description to boundaries (e.g. 'DMZ — internet-facing zone'). Descriptions improve AI prompt quality. |
| Servers have classification | 0% (0/22) | 15 | Set classification= (PUBLIC/INTERNAL/RESTRICTED/SECRET) on servers. Classification affects severity scoring. |
| Servers described | 0% (0/22) | 5 | Add description= to servers. Descriptions are used in AI prompts and improve threat specificity. |
| Actors described | 0% (0/7) | 5 | Add description= to actors. Descriptions help the AI identify privilege levels and attack surfaces. |
| Model defines at least one boundary | ✓ | 5 | |
| Model defines at least one dataflow | ✓ | 5 |
The organisation faces a CRITICAL security posture with unpatched core infrastructure enabling system compromise and credential exposure across identity flows. The Red/Blue debate confirmed that financially motivated attack scenarios for financial data exfiltration remain viable after Blue's defences, indicating active exploitation risk. High-severity denial of service threats to OT SCADA and IT zones, combined with firewall misconfigurations, create immediate paths for disruption and unauthorized access. Prioritising emergency patching, network segmentation, and encrypted credential transmission is essential to reducing existential risk.
| Action | Impact | Effort | Addresses |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deploy network segmentation and micro-segmentation to isolate OT SCADA and IT infrastructure zones, limiting lateral movement from DMZ attacks. | HIGH | MEDIUM | T-0001, T-0002, T-0003, T-0004 |
| Apply emergency patching cycle for all edge routers, firewalls, web application firewalls, reverse proxies, and mail gateways to eliminate critical unpatched vulnerability paths. | HIGH | HIGH | T-0005, T-0006, T-0007, T-0008, T-0009, T-0010, T-0011 |
| Enforce encrypted credential transmission and zero-trust access controls for all employee-to-AD, ERP, and database data flows to prevent information disclosure. | HIGH | MEDIUM | T-0012, T-0013, T-0014, T-0015, T-0016, T-0017, T-0018, T-0019, T-0020 |
| Review and remediate firewall rule sets to block unintended traffic bypass and enforce strict spoofing protections at the perimeter. | HIGH | MEDIUM | T-0001 |
| Implement logging and anomaly detection for repudiation vectors to improve forensic capability and accountability across distributed systems. | MEDIUM | LOW | T-0021, T-0022, T-0023, T-0024, T-0025, T-0026, T-0027, T-0028, T-0029, T-0030, T-0031, T-0032, T-0033, T-0034, T-0035, T-0036, T-0037, T-0038, T-0039, T-0040, T-0041, T-0042, T-0043, T-0044, T-0045, T-0046, T-0047, T-0048, T-0049, T-0050 |
Interactive attack-surface map. Click a node to list its threats. Node colour = highest severity. Edge style: solid = encrypted, dashed = plain.
Each row represents a potential pivot chain: an attacker compromises the Entry Point component via its highest-severity threat, then traverses the dataflow to exploit the Target component. Chains are ranked by average severity. Showing top 10 of 31 chains.
| # | Chain Score | Entry Point | Dataflow / Protocol | Target | Entry Threat | Pivot Threat |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | CRITICAL (10.0) | External Attacker |
ExternalToRouter
TCP |
Edge Router |
Tampering
Untrusted actor External Attacker may attempt to inject malicious data or exploit...
|
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Edge Router leading to system compromise
|
| 2 | CRITICAL (10.0) | Remote Employee |
RemoteToVPN
IPSEC |
Corporate VPN Gateway |
Tampering
Untrusted actor Remote Employee may attempt to inject malicious data or exploit vulnerabilities...
|
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Corporate VPN Gateway leading to system compromise
|
| 3 | CRITICAL (10.0) | External Attacker |
ExternalToMail
SMTP |
Mail Gateway |
Tampering
Untrusted actor External Attacker may attempt to inject malicious data or exploit...
|
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Mail Gateway leading to system compromise
|
| 4 | CRITICAL (10.0) | Edge Router |
RouterToWAF
HTTP |
Web Application Firewall |
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Edge Router leading to system compromise
|
Spoofing
Firewall rule misconfiguration allowing unintended traffic to bypass Web Application Firewall...
|
| 5 | CRITICAL (10.0) | Web Application Firewall |
WAFToProxy
HTTP |
Reverse Proxy |
Spoofing
Firewall rule misconfiguration allowing unintended traffic to bypass Web Application Firewall...
|
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Reverse Proxy leading to system compromise
|
| 6 | CRITICAL (10.0) | Reverse Proxy |
ProxyToInternalFW
HTTP |
Internal Firewall |
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Reverse Proxy leading to system compromise
|
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Internal Firewall leading to system compromise
|
| 7 | CRITICAL (10.0) | Mail Gateway |
MailToWorkstation
SMTP |
Employee Workstation |
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Mail Gateway leading to system compromise
|
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Employee Workstation leading to system compromise
|
| 8 | CRITICAL (10.0) | Corporate VPN Gateway |
VPNToInternalFW
IPSEC |
Internal Firewall |
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Corporate VPN Gateway leading to system compromise
|
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Internal Firewall leading to system compromise
|
| 9 | CRITICAL (10.0) | Internal Firewall |
InternalFWToWorkstation
TCP |
Employee Workstation |
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Internal Firewall leading to system compromise
|
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Employee Workstation leading to system compromise
|
| 10 | CRITICAL (10.0) | Employee Workstation |
WorkstationToAD
LDAP |
Primary Domain Controller |
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Employee Workstation leading to system compromise
|
Tampering
Unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities on Primary Domain Controller leading to system compromise
|
Objective-based attack paths computed by the Goal-Driven Attack Flow engine. Each scenario models a complete adversary journey from entry point to high-value target, with MITRE ATT&CK techniques assigned per hop. Sorted by path score (highest risk first).
| # | Risk | Objective | Actor | Attack Path | Score | Hops | Detection |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
1
GDAF-1D6A86E1
|
CRITICAL |
Financial Data Exfiltration
Steal financial records, SAP data, and transaction history
|
Financially Motivated Cybercriminal Group
medium
|
Mail Gateway → Employee Workstation → Primary Domain Controller → Jump Server → Financial ERP System | 6.22 | 5 | 50% |
|
2
GDAF-8E01A940
|
CRITICAL |
Financial Data Exfiltration
Steal financial records, SAP data, and transaction history
|
Financially Motivated Cybercriminal Group
medium
|
Edge Router → Web Application Firewall → Reverse Proxy → Internal Firewall → Employee Workstation → Primary Domain Controller → Jump Server → Financial ERP System | 6.02 | 8 | 46% |
|
3
GDAF-A60D8259
|
CRITICAL |
Financial Data Exfiltration
Steal financial records, SAP data, and transaction history
|
Financially Motivated Cybercriminal Group
medium
|
Mail Gateway → Employee Workstation → SIEM Server → Primary Domain Controller → Jump Server → Financial ERP System | 6.0 | 6 | 55% |
|
4
GDAF-6105523A
|
CRITICAL |
Financial Data Exfiltration
Steal financial records, SAP data, and transaction history
|
Financially Motivated Cybercriminal Group
medium
|
Mail Gateway → Employee Workstation → Primary Domain Controller → Jump Server → Financial ERP System → Core Database Cluster | 6.09 | 6 | 45% |
|
5
GDAF-3B8FB173
|
CRITICAL |
Financial Data Exfiltration
Steal financial records, SAP data, and transaction history
|
Financially Motivated Cybercriminal Group
medium
|
Mail Gateway → Employee Workstation → SIEM Server → Primary Domain Controller → Jump Server → Financial ERP System → Core Database Cluster | 5.92 | 7 | 50% |
|
6
GDAF-91E7498A
|
CRITICAL |
Financial Data Exfiltration
Steal financial records, SAP data, and transaction history
|
Financially Motivated Cybercriminal Group
medium
|
Corporate VPN Gateway → Internal Firewall → Employee Workstation → Primary Domain Controller → Jump Server → Financial ERP System → Core Database Cluster | 5.88 | 7 | 50% |
|
7
GDAF-B8685518
|
CRITICAL |
Financial Data Exfiltration
Steal financial records, SAP data, and transaction history
|
Malicious Insider
low
|
Financial ERP System | 5.75 | 1 | 20% |
|
8
GDAF-DFDEA639
|
CRITICAL |
Financial Data Exfiltration
Steal financial records, SAP data, and transaction history
|
Malicious Insider
low
|
Employee Workstation → Primary Domain Controller → Jump Server → Financial ERP System | 5.36 | 4 | 50% |
|
9
GDAF-0DE747D6
|
CRITICAL |
Financial Data Exfiltration
Steal financial records, SAP data, and transaction history
|
Malicious Insider
low
|
Employee Workstation → SIEM Server → Primary Domain Controller → Jump Server → Financial ERP System | 5.26 | 5 | 56% |
|
10
GDAF-4684E1B7
|
CRITICAL |
Financial Data Exfiltration
Steal financial records, SAP data, and transaction history
|
Malicious Insider
low
|
Financial ERP System → Core Database Cluster | 5.55 | 2 | 20% |
Unlike GDAF (analyst-defined objectives and actors), these paths are found automatically by following each threat's MITRE ATT&CK tactic progression through the architecture. Best (highest-severity) path shown per STRIDE category.
| # | STRIDE Category | Attack Path | Score | Hops | Threats |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Elevation of Privilege | Edge Router → Edge Router → External Attacker → EmployeeToWorkstation → Web Application Firewall → EmployeeToWorkstation → EmployeeToWorkstation → vpn perimeter | 80.0 |
Edge Router
T1195 — Supply Chain Compromise (Initial Access)
Edge Router
T1072 — Software Deployment Tools (Execution)
External Attacker
T1221 — Template Injection (Defense Evasion)
EmployeeToWorkstation
T1056 — Input Capture (Collection)
Web Application Firewall
T1072 — Software Deployment Tools (Execution)
EmployeeToWorkstation
T1005 — Data from Local System (Collection)
EmployeeToWorkstation
T1052 — Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (Exfiltration)
vpn perimeter
T1498 — Network Denial of Service (Impact)
|
T-0005, T-0005, T-0010, T-0012, T-0006, T-0012, T-0012, T-0068 |
|
Narrative: An attacker begins by compromising the Edge Router through a supply chain compromise, leveraging unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities to gain initial access. Using software deployment tools for execution, they pivot to an external attacker position, where template injection is employed to evade defenses. The path then moves to an employee workstation via input capture, collecting credentials transmitted over unencrypted channels. From the web application firewall, the attacker again uses software deployment tools to execute code, before exfiltrating data from the local system over a physical medium. The attack culminates at the VPN perimeter, where network denial of service impacts availability, exploiting the lack of authentication controls to enable credential theft and reuse for unauthorized access.
Business impact: Successful exploitation results in full system compromise of the Edge Router and employee workstations, unauthorized access to the VPN, and potential data exfiltration. The attacker can bypass authentication, steal credentials, disrupt network availability, and pivot laterally across the organization, leading to significant operational disruption, data loss, and reputational damage.
|
|||||
| 2 | Information Disclosure | Edge Router → Edge Router → External Attacker → EmployeeToWorkstation → Web Application Firewall → EmployeeToWorkstation → EmployeeToWorkstation → vpn perimeter | 80.0 |
Edge Router
T1195 — Supply Chain Compromise (Initial Access)
Edge Router
T1072 — Software Deployment Tools (Execution)
External Attacker
T1221 — Template Injection (Defense Evasion)
EmployeeToWorkstation
T1056 — Input Capture (Collection)
Web Application Firewall
T1072 — Software Deployment Tools (Execution)
EmployeeToWorkstation
T1005 — Data from Local System (Collection)
EmployeeToWorkstation
T1052 — Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (Exfiltration)
vpn perimeter
T1498 — Network Denial of Service (Impact)
|
T-0005, T-0005, T-0010, T-0012, T-0006, T-0012, T-0012, T-0068 |
|
Narrative: An attacker begins by compromising the Edge Router through a supply chain attack, leveraging unpatched software to gain initial access. Using software deployment tools, they execute code on the router and pivot to an external foothold. From there, a template injection technique allows defense evasion as malicious data flows into the corporate environment. Credentials and data are captured from the employee-to-workstation channel via input capture, exploiting unencrypted communications. The attacker then harvests local system data and exfiltrates sensitive information over the physical medium. Finally, a network denial-of-service attack targets the VPN perimeter, exploiting the lack of authentication controls to facilitate credential theft and reuse for unauthorized access.
Business impact: Successful exploitation leads to full credential compromise and unauthorized network access, enabling data theft, lateral movement, and operational disruption. The combination of information disclosure and service availability loss threatens sensitive corporate assets, customer trust, and regulatory compliance.
|
|||||
| 3 | Tampering | Edge Router → Edge Router → External Attacker → EmployeeToWorkstation → Web Application Firewall → EmployeeToWorkstation → EmployeeToWorkstation → vpn perimeter | 80.0 |
Edge Router
T1195 — Supply Chain Compromise (Initial Access)
Edge Router
T1072 — Software Deployment Tools (Execution)
External Attacker
T1221 — Template Injection (Defense Evasion)
EmployeeToWorkstation
T1056 — Input Capture (Collection)
Web Application Firewall
T1072 — Software Deployment Tools (Execution)
EmployeeToWorkstation
T1005 — Data from Local System (Collection)
EmployeeToWorkstation
T1052 — Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (Exfiltration)
vpn perimeter
T1498 — Network Denial of Service (Impact)
|
T-0005, T-0005, T-0010, T-0012, T-0006, T-0012, T-0012, T-0068 |
|
Narrative: An attacker begins by compromising the Edge Router through a supply chain compromise, leveraging unpatched OS or software vulnerabilities to gain initial access. Using software deployment tools for execution, they pivot to an External Attacker position where template injection enables defense evasion. The path then moves to an Employee Workstation via input capture, collecting credentials transmitted over unencrypted channels. From there, the attacker exploits the Web Application Firewall through its own software deployment tools, before moving laterally to a second Employee Workstation to harvest data from the local system. Finally, exfiltration over the physical medium allows the extraction of sensitive credentials, culminating in a denial of service attack against the VPN perimeter, which lacks authentication controls and is vulnerable to credential theft and reuse.
Business impact: Successful exploitation results in full credential compromise of corporate employees, unauthorized access to the VPN, and potential disruption of network availability. The attacker can pivot from the Edge Router through workstations to exfiltrate sensitive data, while the unprotected VPN perimeter enables unauthorized access to internal resources, causing significant operational and reputational damage.
|
|||||
Each top attack path below was challenged in a multi-round Red (attack) vs. Blue
(defence) exchange. Read it for what Blue blocked, where detection gaps remain, and
what Red tried and failed. The verdict is a qualitative outcome — the numeric score
adjustment it drives is directional, not precise (see docs/evaluation.md).
Verdict: Viable but detected — Blue has reliable coverage. Red tried and failed to bypass 2 technique(s); 2 detection gap(s) remain.
| Step | Control family | Covered | Detail | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| hop 2 SSH access | SIEM | ❌ | No correlation rule for password-auth SSH from external IP ranges | medium |
| T1190 via SMTP Mail Gateway | IDS | ❌ | No IDS signature for unauthenticated unencrypted SMTP spearphishing link delivery | medium |
docs/evaluation.md)
Verdict: Viable but detected — Blue has reliable coverage. Red tried and failed to bypass 2 technique(s); 2 detection gap(s) remain.
| Step | Control family | Covered | Detail | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| hop 2 SSH access | SIEM | ❌ | No correlation rule for password-auth SSH from external IP ranges | medium |
| hop 2 SSH access | SIEM | ❌ | No correlation rule for password-auth SSH from external IP ranges | medium |
docs/evaluation.md)
Verdict: Viable but detected — Blue has reliable coverage. Red tried and failed to bypass 2 technique(s); 2 detection gap(s) remain.
| Step | Control family | Covered | Detail | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| hop 2 SSH access | SIEM | ❌ | No correlation rule for password-auth SSH from external IP ranges | medium |
| hop 2 SSH access | SIEM | ❌ | No correlation rule for password-auth SSH from external IP ranges | medium |
docs/evaluation.md)
Verdict: Viable but detected — Blue has reliable coverage. Red tried and failed to bypass 2 technique(s); 2 detection gap(s) remain.
| Step | Control family | Covered | Detail | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| hop 2 SSH access | SIEM | ❌ | No correlation rule for password-auth SSH from external IP ranges | medium |
| hop 2 SSH access | SIEM | ❌ | No correlation rule for password-auth SSH from external IP ranges | medium |
docs/evaluation.md)
Verdict: Viable but detected — Blue has reliable coverage. Red tried and failed to bypass 2 technique(s); 2 detection gap(s) remain.
| Step | Control family | Covered | Detail | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| hop 2 LDAP credential harvest | IDS | ❌ | No IDS signature for unencrypted LDAP bind with anonymous access on port 389 | medium |
| hop 2 SSH access | SIEM | ❌ | No correlation rule for password-auth SSH from external IP ranges | medium |
docs/evaluation.md)
Threat severity is calculated on a scale of 1.0 to 10.0 using the following factors: 1. **Base Score**: Each STRIDE threat category has a predefined base score (ElevationOfPrivilege: 9.0, Tampering: 8.0, InformationDisclosure: 7.5, Spoofing: 7.0, DenialOfService: 6.0, Repudiation: 5.0). 2. **Impact and Likelihood**: If provided (scale 1–5), their product is normalised and added. 3. **Target Multipliers**: Per-element multipliers from the '## Severity Multipliers' section of the model. 4. **Protocol Adjustments**: SSH +0.5, HTTPS -0.3, HTTP +0.2. 5. **Data Classification**: PUBLIC ×1.0, RESTRICTED ×1.2, SECRET ×1.5, TOP_SECRET ×2.0 multiplier. 6. **VOC Context (when available)**: - Known CVE match for this target: +0.5 - High-risk CWE class (injection, buffer overflow, hardcoded creds…): +0.3 - Network-exposed without authentication or encryption: +0.7 - Active D3FEND defensive controls in place: -0.5 The final score is clamped to [1.0, 10.0] and mapped to INFORMATIONAL / LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH / CRITICAL.
Legend:
* : Indicates a CAPEC or MITRE mapping was manually added to improve relevance.
: Indicates a mitigation has been implemented (as defined in the implemented mitigations file).
| # | Target | Business Value | Source | Description | Conf. | CVEs | Severity | Risk Signals | CAPEC | MITRE Techniques | MITRE Mitigations | D3FEND Mitigations | CIS Mitigations | NIST Mitigations | OWASP Mitigations | Detection (SOC) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 |
ot scada zone | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) OT SCADA Zone Process Disruption via Network Attack: The OT SCADA Zone has no network-level protections (WAF, IDS, IPS) and no redundancy. An attacker targeting manufacturing availability can directly interfere with critical control loops, causing process disruption or physical damage.
TK-B0AC3A2C
|
0.90
|
|
CRITICAL (10.0) |
NET
⛔D3F
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
🔍 LOW
Missing logs (4)
SIEM rules (2)
Non-OT process establishing Modbus TCP connections
SysmonEvent3 AND DestinationPort=502 AND NOT ParentImage IN ('*\svchost.exe', '*\services.exe', '*\plc_daemon.exe')
DNP3 outbound traffic from workstations to SCADA subnet
FlowLog AND DestinationPort=20000 AND SourceZone=Internal AND NOT DestinationIP IN SCADA_whitelist
IOCs (3)
|
|
2 |
dmz | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) DMZ Infrastructure Saturation via Volumetric Attack: Without IPS or redundancy protections, the DMZ is susceptible to volumetric Denial of Service attacks. An attacker floods the DMZ entry points with traffic, exhausting bandwidth or connection capacity and preventing legitimate traffic from reaching internal services, directly impacting availability.
TK-FC9913F3
|
0.90
|
|
HIGH (8.7) |
NET
⛔D3F
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
🔍 MEDIUM
Missing logs (3)
SIEM rules (2)
DMZ ingress interface utilization threshold
interface_utilization > 80% AND ingress_packets_per_second > 10000 within 1m
High volume SMTP connections to mail gateway
EventID=672 AND count > 500 within 5m grouped by DestinationIP
IOCs (3)
|
|
3 |
it infrastructure zone | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) Ransomware-Induced Encryption of Critical IT Infrastructure: The IT Infrastructure Zone lacks redundancy, IDS/IPS, and robust backup validation. An attacker delivers ransomware via phishing or exploited vulnerability, encrypting critical servers and databases. Without verified backups and with no network segmentation, the entire IT Infrastructure Zone is rendered unavailable, causing cascading failures to dependent systems including the Finance Zone and Active Directory.
TK-23D94C0A
|
0.90
|
|
HIGH (8.7) |
NET
⛔D3F
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
🔍 MEDIUM
Missing logs (4)
SIEM rules (2)
Rapid file encryption pattern detection
FileChangeRate > 1000 within 1m AND FileExtension IN (.docx, .xlsx, .pdf, .sql) AND NOT BackupServiceProcess
Ransomware note file creation
NewFileCreation AND FileName MATCHES *README* OR *RECOVER* OR *DECRYPT* AND Directory IN (*Desktop*, *Documents*)
IOCs (3)
|
|
4 |
Financial ERP System | N/A |
pytm
|
Denial of Service against Financial ERP System through resource-intensive queries or excessive connections
TK-3F468D16
|
1.00
|
|
CRITICAL (9.4) |
D3F
|
|
|
|
—
|
||||
5 |
Core Database Cluster | N/A |
pytm
|
Denial of Service against Core Database Cluster through resource-intensive queries or excessive connections
TK-8B41FBB8
|
1.00
|
|
CRITICAL (9.4) |
D3F
|
|
|
|
—
|
||||
6 |
External Attacker → Web Application Firewall → Reverse Proxy → Internal Firewall → Core Database Cluster | N/A |
LLM
|
(RAG-LLM) DDoS Amplification and Service Disruption via WAF Bypass: An external attacker launches a DDoS attack targeting the e-commerce platform during a high-traffic period. The attacker attempts to bypass the Web Application Firewall (WAF) and Reverse Proxy by sending crafted HTTP requests that exploit known vulnerabilities or exhaustion vectors. If the WAF is overwhelmed or misconfigured, the traffic reaches the Internal Firewall and ultimately the Kubernetes infrastructure. This could lead to resource exhaustion on the Core Database Cluster and Application Servers, denying service to legitimate customers. The attack may also be used as a smokescreen for concurrent data exfiltration attempts across trust boundaries.
TK-1093001B
|
0.88
|
|
CRITICAL (10.0) |
⛔D3F
|
|
|
|
—
|
||||
7 |
Financial ERP System | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) Financial ERP Database Availability Exhaustion via Malformed Queries: The Financial ERP System has no IPS or WAF protection and runs on physical hardware with no redundancy. An attacker with internal network access can send resource-exhausting SQL queries or connection floods, causing database unavailability and halting all financial processing operations, violating IEC 62443 availability requirements.
TK-D370F154
|
0.90
|
|
CRITICAL (9.4) |
D3F
|
|
🔍 MEDIUM
Missing logs (4)
SIEM rules (2)
Financial ERP database connection pool exhaustion
Metric: DB_Connection_Pool_Utilization > 90% within 5m AND DB_Active_Queries > 500 per minute
Resource-intensive SQL query patterns from internal hosts
DB_Query_Duration > 30 AND DB_Query_CPU > 5 AND SourceHost NOT IN (FinancialERPCluster)
IOCs (3)
|
||||||
8 |
SCADA HMI | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) SCADA HMI Service Disruption via RDP Session Flood: The SCADA HMI lacks connection limiting on its RDP endpoint. An attacker sending a high volume of RDP connection requests can exhaust session resources, causing legitimate operators to be locked out during critical manufacturing operations.
TK-5A044240
|
0.90
|
|
HIGH (8.9) |
D3F
|
|
|
🔍 HIGH
Missing logs (4)
SIEM rules (3)
High volume of RDP connection attempts to SCADA HMI
event_type=rdp_connection AND destination_ip=scada_hmi_ip AND count > 50 within 5m AND source_zone=internal
RDP session establishment without successful authentication
event_type=rdp_authentication_failure AND destination_ip=scada_hmi_ip AND count > 20 within 10m
Unusual RDP session duration patterns
event_type=rdp_session AND session_duration_seconds < 5 AND session_status=connected AND destination_ip=scada_hmi_ip
IOCs (3)
|
|||||
9 |
Web Application Firewall | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) WAF Rule Set Exhaustion causing Service Unavailability: The Web Application Firewall is a virtual machine with no redundant path. An attacker sending high-volume requests with complex payloads designed to trigger expensive ModSecurity rule evaluations (e.g., heavy regex patterns or deep content inspection) can exhaust the WAF's CPU and memory resources. This causes the WAF to drop legitimate traffic or fail open, effectively performing a Denial of Service on the web application behind it.
TK-8C36BE54
|
0.90
|
|
HIGH (7.6) |
NET
D3F
|
|
|
|
🔍 HIGH
Missing logs (5)
SIEM rules (2)
WAF CPU spike due to rule set exhaustion
System_Metrics|Component=WAF AND Metric=CPU_Utilization AND Value > 80 AND Duration > 60s
High volume of complex HTTP requests to WAF
HTTP_Request|DestinationPort=80 OR DestinationPort=443 AND Payload_Size > 2000 AND Request_Count > 100 within 5m
IOCs (3)
|
||||
10 |
Corporate VPN Gateway | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) VPN Gateway Connection Flooding: The Corporate VPN Gateway is a physical appliance with no redundancy configured. An attacker can flood the gateway with IKE/IPsec connection requests, exhausting connection table resources and legitimate user bandwidth. This denies remote employees access to critical internal systems, including engineering workstations and potentially OT management interfaces.
TK-A901E1E7
|
0.90
|
|
HIGH (7.6) |
NET
D3F
|
|
|
|
🔍 HIGH
Missing logs (3)
SIEM rules (2)
VPN gateway IKE connection flooding detection
vpn_gateway_logs and ike_connection_attempts and rate(ike_connection_attempts, 1m) > 1000 grouped by source_ip
VPN gateway connection table exhaustion events
vpn_gateway_logs and connection_table_full_events or user_disconnect_events spike
IOCs (3)
|
||||
11 |
restricted data zone | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) Restricted Data Zone Service Availability Disruption: Absence of IPS, IDS, and redundant infrastructure exposes the Restricted Data Zone services to disruption. An attacker can flood or exploit service vulnerabilities to cause outage, impacting business operations.
TK-1086A1BF
|
0.90
|
|
HIGH (7.6) |
NET
D3F
|
|
|
|
🔍 LOW
Missing logs (3)
SIEM rules (2)
High volume of TCP connections to Restricted Data Zone services
EventID=NAT or FlowLog AND DestinationZone=RestrictedData AND ConnectionCount > 100 within 5m AND Duration < 10s
Application layer request spikes to finance zone endpoints
WAFLog AND EndpointPath contains "/api" AND RequestCount > 200 within 1m grouped by ClientIP
IOCs (3)
|
||||
12 |
Remote Employee | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) VPN Gateway Connection Flood: The VPN gateway lacks connection rate limiting, allowing an attacker to flood the service with connection requests, displacing legitimate remote employees and disrupting business operations.
TK-B241B621
|
0.90
|
|
MEDIUM (7.0) |
NET
D3F
|
|
|
🔍 MEDIUM
Missing logs (3)
SIEM rules (2)
VPN gateway connection rate exceeding threshold
EventID=VPN_CONNECT_RATE AND count > 50 within 1m FROM SourceIP AND SourceIP!~trusted_employee_range
RDP session establishment from VPN-connected workstation
EventID=RDP_CONNECT AND SourceProcess=~vpn_client AND DestinationPort=3389
IOCs (3)
|
|||||
13 |
IT Administrator | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) Jump Server RDP Service Exhaustion: The jump server RDP service lacks connection rate limiting; an attacker can flood the service with connection requests, preventing legitimate IT administrators from accessing critical infrastructure for maintenance and incident response.
TK-CEC35D93
|
0.90
|
|
MEDIUM (6.9) |
D3F
|
|
|
🔍 HIGH
Missing logs (4)
SIEM rules (2)
High volume of failed RDP logon attempts to jump server
EventID=4625 AND DestinationPort=3389 AND NOT SourceIP IN (IT_Admin_Whitelist) AND count > 20 within 5m
Process creation for mstsc.exe from non-standard sources
EventID=1 AND Image|endswith:\"mstsc.exe" AND SourceIP NOT IN (Corporate_VPN_Gateway_Whitelist)
IOCs (3)
|
|||||
14 |
SCADA Operator | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) SCADA Operator RDP Session Flood causing HMI Unavailability: The SCADA Operator's RDP session to the HMI is the primary human-machine interface for monitoring the manufacturing process. A DoS attack targeting the RDP service or the operator's workstation could lock the session, causing the operator to lose visibility and control. In a critical manufacturing environment, even a brief loss of HMI access can trigger safety mechanisms or prevent timely response to process deviations.
TK-B841E514
|
0.90
|
|
MEDIUM (6.9) |
D3F
|
|
|
🔍 HIGH
Missing logs (5)
SIEM rules (2)
RDP session flood detection against SCADA HMI
EventID=4625 AND DestinationIP=SCADA_HMI_IP AND LogonType=10 AND count > 5 within 1m
HMI RDP connection rate anomaly
Sysmon Event 3 | DestinationPort=3389 AND SourceVLAN=IT_Network AND DestinationIP=SCADA_HMI_IP AND connection_rate > 10 per minute
IOCs (3)
|
|||||
15 |
Internal DNS Server | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) DNS Server Resource Exhaustion via Recursive Queries: The DNS server is configured to perform recursive queries for external domains without rate limiting or query restrictions. An attacker sends a high volume of queries for non-existent or external domains, exhausting server resources and causing legitimate DNS resolution to fail.
TK-DB3BD3A6
|
0.90
|
|
MEDIUM (6.9) |
D3F
|
🔍 MEDIUM
Missing logs (3)
SIEM rules (2)
DNS server recursive query volume spike from single source
dns_query_logs and query_recursive=1 and rate(count, 1m) > 500 grouped by source_ip
DNS server resource utilization anomalies
dns_server_metrics and (cpu_usage > 80 OR memory_usage > 80) during query flood events
IOCs (3)
|
|||||||
16 |
File Server | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) SMB Share Availability Disruption via File Locking: Lack of redundant storage and unsecured SMB shares allow an attacker to deny service to legitimate users by locking files or filling disk space, halting manufacturing operations that depend on shared data.
TK-ED7EE943
|
0.90
|
|
MEDIUM (6.9) |
D3F
|
|
|
|
|
🔍 MEDIUM
Missing logs (3)
SIEM rules (2)
SMB file lock duration exceeding threshold
EventID=5145 AND LockDuration > 300 AND User != 'SYSTEM' AND User != 'Administrator'
SMB disk space consumption spike
EventID=5146 AND FileSize > 10MB AND DestinationPath CONTAINS 'share_name' AND NOT User IN ('svc_account', 'backup_user')
IOCs (3)
|
|||
17 |
Finance Workstation | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) Finance Workstation Disk Wipe or Ransomware Execution: The Finance Workstation has no IDS/IPS protection and no redundant storage. A single click on a malicious link or attachment can execute ransomware that encrypts local files, wiping out unsaved work, financial spreadsheets, and local caches required for daily operations, causing operational disruption.
TK-417AB55C
|
0.90
|
|
MEDIUM (6.9) |
D3F
|
|
|
|
🔍 HIGH
Missing logs (4)
SIEM rules (2)
Ransomware file encryption behavior on Finance Workstation
EndpointEvent AND FileEncryptionRate > 10� per minute AND Process NOT IN (known_backup_tools) AND User = 'finance_user'
Ransom note creation events
FileCreate AND FileName MATCHES '*.ransom* OR *README* OR *RECOVER*' AND Directory CONTAINS 'Finance'
IOCs (4)
|
||||
18 |
CI CD Pipeline | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) CI/CD Pipeline Resource Exhaustion and Build Interruption: The CI/CD Pipeline runs on a virtual machine with no redundant resources and no IPS/WAF protection. An attacker who can trigger pipeline builds (e.g., by pushing many small commits or exploiting a webhook) can exhaust CPU, memory, or disk space on the pipeline executor, causing build failures and delaying all software delivery and deployment activities, including critical security patch deployment to production systems.
TK-B622CAAE
|
0.90
|
|
MEDIUM (6.9) |
D3F
|
🔍 LOW
Missing logs (4)
SIEM rules (2)
High volume of git push events to CI/CD pipeline within short timeframe
event_type=webhook AND event_name=git_push AND count(destination_ip) > 20 within 5m AND source_repo NOT in (approved_repos)
CI/CD pipeline build duration anomalies
event_type=build_metric AND build_duration_seconds < 30 AND build_status=failed AND resource_type=CPU
IOCs (3)
|
|||||||
19 |
Corporate Employee | N/A |
AI
|
(AI) RDP Session Flooding and Workstation Resource Exhaustion: An attacker sends repeated RDP connection requests to the employee workstation, overwhelming system resources and causing denial of service for the legitimate user, disrupting daily manufacturing operations.
TK-A1C69C4F
|
0.90
|
|
LOW (5.1) |
D3F
|
🔍 MEDIUM
Missing logs (3)
SIEM rules (2)
Rapid RDP connection attempts to single workstation
EventID=RDP_CONNECT AND DestinationWorkstation=~target AND count > 20 within 5m grouped by SourceIP
RDP service resource utilization anomaly
HostMetric=CPU > 80 AND ProcessName=mstsc.exe AND time_window > 10m
IOCs (3)
|